Propose or Vote: A Canonical Democratic Procedure

Hans Gersbach

No 21026, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: How should collective decision-making with proposal-making and voting be organized in the absence of a centralized mechanism designer? We introduce Propose or Vote (PoV), a democratic procedure in which agents choose between exercising proposal power and retaining voting rights. Under one-dimensional single-peaked preferences, PoV implements the Condorcet winner in a single voting round. For an odd number of agents, the implementing equilibrium is globally unique: exactly the median agent chooses to propose. For an even number of agents, multiplicity may arise, but uniqueness can be restored through a simple tie-breaking device. The results show how efficient agenda formation can emerge from decentralized incentives without preference revelation or centralized enforcement. The framework extends naturally to candidate elections.

Keywords: proposal-making; Democracy; Majority voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01
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Working Paper: Propose or Vote: A Canonical Democratic Procedure (2025)
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