Information Span in Credit Market Competition

Zhiguo He, Jing Huang and Cecilia Parlatore Siritto

No 21310, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We develop a credit market competition model that distinguishes between information span (breadth) and signal precision (quality), capturing the rise of fintech/non-bank lending where traditionally subjective (“soft†) information is transformed into objective (“hard†) data. Borrower quality depends on multidimensional fundamentals, assessed through hard or soft signals. Two banks observe private hard signals, but only the specialized bank receives a soft signal. Expanding the span of hard information enables the non-specialized bank to evaluate characteristics previously only available to the specialist, and reducing its winner’s curse. By contrast, greater precision of hard signals strengthens the specialized bank’s informational advantage.

Keywords: Banking competition; Information technology; Fintech; Specialized Lending; Winner's curse (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 L13 L52 O33 O36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-03
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