Do Elections Moderate or Polarize Political Rhetoric?

Tito Boeri, Nina Nikiforova and Guido Tabellini

No 21317, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper studies how elections shape political communication. We formulate a theory of electoral competition with costly communication. If opposite candidates reach different audiences with their messages, they diverge and seek to polarize the electorate. We then analyze Twitter/X communication by 367 political leaders in 21 countries during 2013-2022, focusing on competition between populists and non-populists. Following Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy (2019), we estimate a structural model of speech and show that political rhetoric becomes more polarized before the election. This reflects two main theoretical mechanisms: politicians increasingly emphasize issues distinctive of their type, and within each issue, they use more extreme language.

Keywords: Electoral competition; Populism; Partisanship; Polarization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H P (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Do Elections Moderate or Polarize Political Rhetoric? (2026)
Working Paper: Do Elections Moderate or Polarize Political Rhetoric? (2026)
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