Competing with Term Length

Hans Gersbach and Arthur Schichl

No 21334, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper introduces political term length as a strategic variable in electoral competition, allowing candidates to compete not only over policy but also over the duration of their mandate if elected. In a two-candidate race with an incumbent and a challenger, we model the incentives to propose either a short term (e.g., two years) or a long term (e.g., four years). Because voters can directly assess the incumbent’s ability but face uncertainty about the challenger’s, strong incumbents may favor longer terms while challengers, and weaker incumbents, may prefer shorter ones. We develop a dynamic election model in which candidates compete on term length, characterize the equilibria, and show how such competition can enhance voter welfare by balancing experimentation with new officeholders against stability under high-performing officeholders.

Keywords: Electoral competition; Term length (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-03
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