Violence, Political Selection, and State Formation: Evidence from Post-Unification Italy

Paolo Buonanno, Giampaolo Lecce, Laura Ogliari and Giacomo Plevani

No 21428, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study how violence reshapes electoral competition and political selection during state formation. Using new district-level data on brigandage, elections, and political elites in post-unification Southern Italy, we show that violence reduced turnout, especially where it increased the risks of accessing polling stations. Beyond participation, brigandage also altered the supply side of politics: exposed districts experienced fewer contested elections and fewer new candidates. At the same time, political representation shifted away from aristocratic deputies and toward more locally embedded elites with administrative experience, while candidate pools also moved away from court-linked elite profiles. We provide evidence that these shifts were also reflected in parliamentary activity, with locally embedded representatives placing relatively greater emphasis on territorially targeted claims. Consistent with this pattern, districts more exposed to violence experienced greater expansion of the road network, but not railways, precisely where conflict induced a stronger shift toward local representation. These findings point to a political-representation channel through which violence shapes development, by altering who competes for office and how public resources are allocated.

JEL-codes: D72 H41 N43 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04
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