Defense Spending, Cost of Living, and the Optimal Exchange Rate Regime during Wartime in Ukraine

Oliver de Groot and Yevhenii Skok

No 21509, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Were either the exceptional defense spending needs of the government or the sharp increase in the cost-of-living of poorer households factors that rationalize the National Bank of Ukraine’s temporary fix of the Hryvnia when Russia invaded in 2022? To test the validity of these explanations, we develop a small open-economy two-agent New Keynesian (SOE-TANK) model of Ukraine featuring: 1) a government that finances military imports and 2) low- and high-income households. We find that the surge in foreign-currency-denominated military spending alone does not justify a temporary exchange-rate peg. However, when the consumption of low income households is close to subsistence levels, we find that the optimal exchange rate regime becomes state-contingent: exchange-rate flexibility is desirable for small shocks, whereas for a large-scale invasion shock, a fixed exchange rate dominates a floating regime with a standard Taylor rule.

Keywords: Central banking; Monetary policy; Emerging markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 E52 F31 F41 G01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP21509 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21509

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP21509

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().