The Politics of Cooptation

Michael Spagat and Graziella Bertocchi ()

No 2156, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Group 1 holds political power. Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the upheaval probability by coopting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign Group 3. Improvements in upheaval technology lead to less cooptation. Increasing the relative size of Group 1 implies larger cooptation payments to a smaller group, decreasing the total resources committed to cooptation. In an extension in which Group 3 also threatens Group 1, although less destructively than does Group 2, cooptation transfers are reduced. Growth causes political stabilization. The theory applies to the origin of the welfare state, post-communist privatization and other situations.

Keywords: Welfare state; Privatization; cooptation; upheaval (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D3 D74 H3 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Journal Article: The Politics of Co-optation (2001)
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