Administrative litigation and public procurement outcomes: Evidence from Italy

Enza Maltese and Gabriele Rovigatti

No 21813, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Administrative review protects legality and contestability in public procurement, but it may also delay public investment, alter the choices of contracting authorities and generate defensive responses by public administrations. This paper studies these effects by linking the universe of Italian procurement procedures to newly released administrative-court records for 2023–2025. Appeals concern only 0.4 percent of procedures but 7.2 percent of tendered value and are concentrated in large, competitive contracts. Using matched duration models, we show that litigated procedures are associated with award times more than 35 percent longer than comparable procedures without appeals and that public works also reach construction-site opening later. Being subject to an appeal has sizeable effects on the subsequent behavior of contracting authorities, as they publish fewer (-30 percent) and smaller (-55 percent on average) public-works tenders and shift away from open procedures toward direct awards. These changes are larger among municipalities with lower administrative capacity. The evidence points to an enforcement-capacity trade-off: administrative review safeguards procurement integrity, but its administrative burden can slow implementation and induce defensive behavior where state capacity is weak.

JEL-codes: D73 H54 H57 K41 R58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-08
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