Monetary Discipline and Cooperation in the European Monetary System: A Synthesis

Jacques Melitz

No 219, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper tries to explain how, despite its fundamental asymmetry, the European Monetary System may benefit all its members. I argue that the high-inflation members obtain benefits of increased monetary discipline, while the others experience improvements in their international competitiveness. For the low-inflation members, moreover, the incentive to disinflate increases as a result of EMS membership. Finally, the benefits of membership for low-inflation countries are secure; for those with higher inflation, the gains from membership depend on a variety of factors whose net effect is uncertain.

Keywords: Competitiveness; European Monetary System; Incentives; Monetary Discipline (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1988-01
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