Digital (Killer?) Acquisitions

Florian Ederer, Regina Seibel and Timothy S. Simcoe

No 21919, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper examines innovation outcomes before and after 1,200 startup acquisitions by eight major technology firms. Linking patent and workforce data to these deals, we document four main findings. First, most acquired startups hold no patents, but those with patents tend to operate in technology areas where the acquirer already has a presence and that see further acquisition activity. Second, innovation typically rises before an acquisition, continues afterward only where further acquisitions follow, and falls back once acquisition activity ends. We propose a stylized model in which beliefs about commercial viability drive both startup entry and acquisitions to explain how these patterns arise through selection rather than effects of the deals. Third, acquired patents receive significantly more citations after the acquisition than comparable patents, not only from the acquirer but also from firms that hire the targets' employees. Fourth, although 31% of employees and 23% of inventors depart within a year, inventors who stay go on to patent substantially more, while stayers and leavers were equally productive beforehand. In the aggregate, we find little evidence that acquisitions by digital incumbents suppress innovation, even though serial acquisitions go hand in hand with growing patent consolidation.

Keywords: Innovation; Acquisitions; Patents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L41 O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
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