Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence

Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate

No 2381, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues for which the appointing politicians are responsible. Since regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, regulatory policy outcomes reflect the preferences of party élites and special interests. Direct election of regulators strengthens the power of voters by ensuring the saliency of regulatory issues. Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from US states, we find evidence in favour of the idea that elected states are more pro-consumer in their regulatory policies.

Keywords: Elections; Electricity; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 L51 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Journal Article: Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence (2003)
Working Paper: Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence (2000)
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