Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance Through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries
Roel Beetsma and
Eric Bartelsman
No 2543, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
This paper presents evidence of profit shifting in response to differences in corporate tax rates for a large selection of OECD countries. In our estimates we control for the effects of tax rate changes on real activity. Our baseline estimates suggest that, on average, a unilateral increase in the corporate tax rate does not lead to an increase in corporate tax revenues owing to a more than offsetting decline in reported profits.
Keywords: Profit shifting; Transfer pricing; Corporate tax rates; Stan database (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F20 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP2543 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
Journal Article: Why pay more? Corporate tax avoidance through transfer pricing in OECD countries (2003) 
Working Paper: Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries (2000) 
Working Paper: Why pay more? Corporate Tax Avoidance through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries (2000) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2543
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP2543
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().