Corporate Taxation, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Integration

Guttorm Schjelderup, Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe and Hans Jarle Kind

No 2753, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This Paper studies how economic integration affects transfer pricing, tax policy and welfare, when multinationals are taxed either according to formula apportionment (FA) or separate accounting (SA). It is shown that economic integration induces multinationals to lower their transfer prices under both tax systems, but that transfer prices become less tax sensitive under FA than under SA. A main result of the paper is that economic integration lowers tax rates in the Nash equilibrium under SA, but leads to higher taxes in the Nash equilibrium under FA.

Keywords: Multinational enterprises; Tax regimes; International tax competition; Economic integration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F15 F23 H25 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP2753 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2753

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP2753

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().