Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability

Timothy Besley and Andrea Prat

No 3132, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: It is widely recognized that active media can play a role in enhancing political competition by informing voters. Collusion between government and media can, however, undermine this role. We extend the political accountability model to include the presence of media outlets and the possibility that the incumbent exerts influence over them. In equilibrium, the media structure is linked to political outcomes in two ways: directly through its monitoring capacity and indirectly through political capture. We examine evidence both across countries and within India.

JEL-codes: D70 H10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Journal Article: Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability (2006)
Working Paper: Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability (2005)
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