The Determinants of Privatized Enterprise Performance in Russia

Saul Estrin, Manuela Angelucci, Alan Bevan, Julian A Fennema, Boris Kuznetsov, Giovanni Mangiarotti and Mark Schaffer ()

No 3193, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Using data from a large enterprise-level panel designed to address this issue, we account for enterprise performance in Russia. We link performance to four aspects of the economic environment outlined in the literature: enterprise ownership; corporate governance; market structures and competition; and financial constraints. We conclude that private ownership and better performance are not correlated, though restructuring is positively associated with the competitiveness of the market environment. These findings on private ownership support those of previous studies, eg Earle and Estrin (1997). Moreover, we find only limited evidence that financially unconstrained firms are better in their undertaking of restructuring measures then financially constrained firms. Further analysis suggests that causality runs from restructuring to financial constraint, rather than the reverse. Finally, our findings indicate strong complementarities between the four factors influencing improved company performance, confirming the view that these factors need to be considered jointly.

Keywords: investment; Competition; Corporate governance; Privatisation; Enterprise performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 G34 L10 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Working Paper: The Determinants of Privatised Enterprise Performance in Russia (2001)
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