Reputation-Based Pricing and Price Improvements in Dealership Markets

Thierry Foucault and Gabriel Desgranges

No 3359, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In many security markets, dealers trade with their regular clients at a discount relative to prevailing bid and ask quotes. In this article we provide an explanation to this phenomenon. We consider a dealer and an investor engaged in a long-term relationship. The dealer assigns a reputational index to his client. This index increases (reputation decreases) when the client conducts trades which results in a loss for the regular dealer. The dealer grants a price improvement if and only if the client?s index is smaller than a threshold and suspends price improvements otherwise. We show that this pricing strategy induces the investor to refrain from exploiting private information against their regular dealer. We also find that it worsens the quotes posted by other dealers. For this reason, there are cases in which the investor is better off if long-term relationships are impossible (for instance, if trading is anonymous). Our model predicts that a dealer?s decision to grant a price improvement depends on their past trading profits with the trader requesting the improvement.

Keywords: Market microstructure; Reputation and implicit contracts; Non-anonymous trading (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G14 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-fmk and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Reputation-Based Pricing and Price Improvements in Dealership Markets (2012)
Working Paper: Reputation-based pricing and price improvements in dealership markets (2005)
Working Paper: Reputation-based pricing and price improvements in dealership markets (2002)
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