Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States
Timothy Besley and
Anne Case
No 3498, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research
Abstract:
A rich array of institutional diversity makes the United States an excellent place to study the relationship between political institutions and public policy outcomes. This Paper has three main aims. First, it reviews existing empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional rules, political representation and policy outcomes. It aims to place the literature into a broader context of theoretical and empirical work in the field of political economy. Second, it develops a parallel empirical analysis that updates studies in the literature and re-examines some of the claims made, in a setting unified both in terms of policy outcomes and the period under study. Third, the paper develops some new directions for research, presenting a small number of novel exploratory results.
Keywords: Empirical political economy; Government behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 H30 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
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Journal Article: Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States (2003) 
Working Paper: Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States (2002) 
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