Incomplete Wage Posting

Javier Suarez and Claudio Michelacci ()

No 3658, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We consider a competitive search model where firms with vacancies choose between posting a wage ex-ante and bargaining it with workers ex-post. Workers apply for vacancies after observing firms' wage setting decisions, and differ in some observable but not verifiable qualifications that affect their productivity in the job. Thus posted wages prevent the hold-up problem associated with bargaining but are incomplete since they cannot be contingent on worker qualifications. In contrast, bargained wages increase with qualifications and, thus, may serve to entice better workers into the vacancy. We find that when the hold-up problem is mild and workers' heterogeneity is large, firms opt for bargaining. Yet equilibria with bargaining always fail to maximize aggregate net income and sometimes fail to be constrained Pareto optimal.

Keywords: Search frictions; Bargaining; Directed search; Adverse selection; Wage inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J30 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Incomplete Wage Posting (2006)
Working Paper: Incomplete Wage Posting (2002)
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