On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition

Patrick Schmitz

No 3774, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Consider two sellers each of whom has one unit of an indivisible good and two buyers each of whom is interested in buying one unit. The sellers simultaneously set reserve prices and use second price auctions as rationing device. An equilibrium in pure strategies where each sellers has a regular customer is characterized. The result is applied in order to demonstrate that not allowing sellers to use second price auctions may enhance total surplus.

Keywords: Auctions; Duopoly; Selling mechanisms; Private information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP3774 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On second-price auctions and imperfect competition (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3774

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP3774

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().