EU Conciliation Committee: Council 56 versus Parliament 6

Mika Widgrén and Stefan Napel

No 4071, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This Paper analyses bargaining between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) in the Conciliation Committee with the aim of evaluating both institutions' power in the European Union's codecision procedure. In contrast to other studies, which use power indices or simple spatial-voting models, both institutions are assumed to act strategically and differences in their internal decision mechanisms are taken into account. Although the CM and the EP have a seemingly symmetric position in the Conciliation Committee, the analysis highlights that the CM is strongly favoured in terms of its average influence on legislation. EU enlargement under the rules of the Treaty of Nice renders the EP almost irrelevant, while the constitutional proposal put forward by the European Convention can lead to a Pareto-improvement.

Keywords: European union; Bargaining; Spatial voting; Codecision procedure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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