Technology Transfer and Spillovers in International Joint Ventures

Monika Schnitzer () and Müller, Thomas
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Thomas Müller

No 4099, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of a potential spillover on technology transfer of a multinational enterprise and on the host country policy. In particular, we examine how both parties’ incentives can be controlled through the ownership structure in an international joint venture. In contrast to existing arguments, we show that spillovers must not always have negative effects on technology transfer and they may be efficiency-improving. Moreover, there are circumstances where a joint venture is mutually beneficial. Surprisingly, however, we find that despite the prospect of spillovers, a joint venture is sometimes not in the interest of a host country.

Keywords: Spillovers; Ownership structure; Foreign direct investment; Multinational enterprise; Transition economies; Joint ventures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 F21 F23 L13 O12 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-ifn, nep-ino and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Technology transfer and spillovers in international joint ventures (2006)
Working Paper: Technology transfer and spillovers in international joint ventures (2006)
Working Paper: Technology Transfer and Spillovers in International Joint Ventures (2005)
Working Paper: Technology Transfer and Spillovers in International Joint Ventures (2003)
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