Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation

Johan Lagerlof and Lars Frisell

No 4313, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policy-maker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truth telling, we show that the larger the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policy-maker. We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare, and discuss the welfare effects of institutions that increase transparency but which, as an unintended side effect, lower the lobbyist?s incentives for truth telling.

Keywords: Lobbying; Interest groups; Reputation; Information transmission; Representation; Inequality; Bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4313 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation (2004)
Working Paper: Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation (2004)
Working Paper: Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4313

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4313

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().