Manipulations in Contests

Aner Sela and Chen Cohen

No 4344, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study the classical Tullock's model of one-stage contests where the probability of winning is a function of the efforts exerted by the contestants. We show that by a simple non-discriminating rule the contest designer is able to manipulate the outcome of the contest such that the probabilities to win are not ordered according to the contestants' abilities.

Keywords: Contests; Tullock's models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-04
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Journal Article: Manipulations in contests (2005)
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