Preferences for Rigid Versus Individualized Wage Setting

Michael Burda and Tito Boeri

No 4444, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Firing frictions and renegotiation costs affect worker and firm preferences for rigid wages versus individualized Nash bargaining in a standard model of equilibrium unemployment, in which workers vary by observable skill. Rigid wages permit savings on renegotiation costs and prevent workers from exploiting the firing friction. For standard calibrations, the model can account for political support for wage rigidity by both workers and firms, especially in labour markets for intermediate skills. The firing friction is necessary for this effect, and reinforces the impact of both turbulence and other labour market institutions on preferences for rigid wages.

Keywords: Wage rigidities; Job protection; Firing taxes; Renegotiation costs; Equilibrium unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 J50 J60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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