Symmetrical Research Joint Ventures: Cooperative Substitutes and Complements

J. Peter Neary and Dermot Leahy

No 4497, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We introduce the concept of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use it to throw light on the conditions for a research joint venture to choose equal levels of R&D by all member firms. We show that the second-order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form, ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity, and nesting conditions already derived in the literature. Finally we explore the implications of our results for the comparison between research joint ventures and a non-cooperative equilibrium.

Keywords: Bertrand and cournot competition; Cooperative substitutes and complements; R&d; Research joint ventures; Strategic trade and industrial policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: Symmetric research joint ventures: Cooperative substitutes and complements (2005)
Working Paper: Symmetric research joint ventures: cooperative substitutes and complements (2004)
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