Conditional versus Contingent Fees

Winand Emons

No 4532, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgement; under conditional fees the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a framework where lawyers are uninformed about the clients? cases. If there is asymmetric information about the merits of cases, in equilibrium attorneys will offer only conditional fees. If there is asymmetric information about the risk of cases, only contingent fee contracts are offered in equilibrium.

Keywords: Contingent fees; Conditional fees; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Screening; Pooling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Conditional versus contingent fees (2007)
Working Paper: Conditional versus Contingent Fees (2004)
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