Bundling and the Unanimity Rule

Hans Gersbach and Ulrich Erlenmaier

No 4808, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In this Paper, we design democratic constitutions that can transcend the shortcomings of the unanimity rule. The constitution embeds the unanimity rule in a set of virtue-supporting principles: (a) broad packages with many public projects (bundling) are allowed, but can only be proposed once in a legislative term; (b) the person who designs the package is also taxed at the highest proposed rate; and (c) subsidies are forbidden. We show that such democratic constitutions can yield efficient public project provision.

Keywords: Unanimity rule; Bundling; Constitutions; Provision of public projects; Amendment rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D70 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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