Optimal Sliding Scale Regulation: An Application to Regional Electricity Distribution in England and Wales

Paul Levine (), Lester Hunt, Neil Rickman and David Hawdon

No 4934, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper examines optimal price (i.e. ?sliding scale?) regulation of a monopoly when efficiency and managerial effort are not observed. We show how to operationalize this model of incentive regulation and use actual data from electricity distribution in England and Wales to make welfare comparisons of sliding scale regulation with a price cap regime and the First-Best (the full information case). Our method enables us to quantify technical uncertainty as faced by the electricity regulator in the 1990s and shows that there are significant welfare gains from a sliding scale relative to the price cap regime.

Keywords: Sliding scale; Regulation; Electricity distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-geo and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4934 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal sliding scale regulation: an application to regional electricity distribution in England and Wales (2007)
Working Paper: Optimal sliding scale regulation: An application to regional electricity distribution in England and Wales (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4934

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4934

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().