On the Uniqueness of Optimal Prices Set by Monopolistic Sellers

Gerard van den Berg

No 5166, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper considers price determination by monopolistic sellers who know the distribution of valuations among the potential buyers. We derive a novel condition under which the optimal price set by the monopolist is unique. In many settings, this condition is easy to interpret, and it is valid for a very wide range of distributions of valuations. The results carry over to the optimal minimum price in independent private value auctions. In addition, they can be fruitfully applied in the analysis of quantity discount price policies.

Keywords: Monopoly; Auction; Regularity; Minimum price; Hazard price; Hazard rate; Quantity discount; Reservation price; Local maxima (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D44 L12 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP5166 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the uniqueness of optimal prices set by monopolistic sellers (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5166

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP5166

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().