Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India

Timothy Besley, Rohini Pande and Vijayendra Rao

No 5201, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper uses household data from India to examine the economic and social status of village politicians, and how individual and village characteristics affect politician behaviour while in office. Education increases the chances of selection to public office and reduces the odds that a politician uses political power opportunistically. In contrast, land ownership and political connections enable selection but do not affect politician opportunism. At the village level, changes in the identity of the politically dominant group alter the group allocation of resources but not politician opportunism. Improved information flows in the village, however, reduce opportunism and improve resource allocation.

Keywords: Public provision of private goods; Political economy; Decentralization; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H42 O12 O20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-dev, nep-edu, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (80)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India (2005)
Working Paper: Political Selection and the Quality ofGovernment: Evidence from South India (2005)
Working Paper: Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India (2005)
Working Paper: Political Selection and the Qualilty of Government: Evidence from South India (2005)
Working Paper: Political selection and the quality of government: evidence from south India (2005)
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