Participation Games: Market Entry, Coordination and the Beautiful Blonde

Simon Anderson and Maxim Engers

No 5241, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We find the Nash equilibria for monotone n-player symmetric games where each player chooses whether to participate. Examples include market entry games, coordination games, and the bar-room game depicted in the movie 'A Beautiful Mind'. The symmetric Nash equilibrium involves excessive participation (a common property resource problem) if participants? payoffs are decreasing (in the number of participants), and insufficient participation if payoffs are increasing. With decreasing payoffs there can be many equilibria, but with increasing payoffs there are only three. Some comparative static properties of changing one player?s participation payoffs are counter-intuitive, especially with more than two players.

Keywords: Market entry; Coordination; Nash equilibrium; Mixed strategy equilibrium; Common property resource problem; Comparative statics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Participation games: Market entry, coordination, and the beautiful blonde (2007)
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