The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity

Richard Blundell (), Peter Howitt, Philippe Aghion, Rachel Griffith and Susanne Prantl

No 5323, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: How does firm entry affect innovation incentives and productivity growth in incumbent firms? Micro-data suggests that there is heterogeneity across industries - incumbents in technologically advanced industries react positively to entry, but not in laggard industries. To explain this pattern, we introduce entry into a Schumpeterian growth model with multiple sectors which differ by their distance to the technological frontier. We show that entry threat spurs innovation incentives in technologically advanced sectors - successful innovation allows incumbents to prevent entry. In laggard sectors it discourages innovation - increased entry reduces incumbents' expected rents from innovating. We find that the empirical patterns hold using rich micro-level productivity growth and patent panel data for the UK, and controlling for the endogeneity of entry by exploiting the large number of policy reforms undertaken during the Thatcher era.

Keywords: Entry; Innovation; Growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 F21 L10 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eff, nep-ent, nep-ino and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity (2009)
Working Paper: The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity (2009)
Working Paper: The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity (2006)
Working Paper: The effects of entry on incumbent innovation and productivity (2006)
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