General Equilibrium and the Emergence of (Non) Market Clearing Trading Institutions

Georg Kirchsteiger and Carlos Alós-Ferrer

No 5795, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We consider a pure exchange economy, where for each good several trading institutions are available, only one of which is market-clearing. The other feasible trading institutions lead to rationing. To learn on which trading institutions to coordinate, traders follow behavioural rules of thumb that are based on the past performances of the trading institutions. Given the choice of institutions, market outcomes are determined by an equilibrium concept that allows for rationing. We find that full coordination on the market-clearing institutions without any rationing is a stochastically stable outcome, independently of the characteristics of the alternative available institutions. We also find, though, that coordination on other, non-market-clearing institutions with rationing can be stochastically stable.

Keywords: Market institutions; Evolution of trading platforms; Learning; General equilibrium; Rationing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C83 D4 D5 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions (2010)
Working Paper: General Equilibrium and the Emergence of (Non) Market Clearing Trading Institutions (2010)
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