Businessman Candidates

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Konstantin Sonin and Scott Gehlbach

No 5985, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In immature democracies, businessmen run for public office to gain direct control over policy; in mature democracies they typically rely on other means of influence. We develop a simple model to show that businessmen run for office only when two conditions hold. First, as in many immature democracies, institutions that make reneging on campaign promises costly must be poorly developed. In such environments, office holders have monopoly power that can be used to extract rents, and businessmen run to capture those rents. Second, the returns to businessmen from policy influence must not be too large, as otherwise high rents from holding office draw professional politicians into the race, crowding out businessmen candidates. Analysis of data on Russian gubernatorial elections supports these predictions. Businessman candidates are less likely 1) in regions with high media freedom and government transparency, institutions that raise the cost of reneging on campaign promises, and 2) in regions where returns to policy influence (measured by regional resource abundance) are large, but only where media are unfree and government nontransparent.

Keywords: Political connections; Businessman candidates; Immature democracy; Media freedom; Government transparency; Strength of political parties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP5985 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Businessman Candidates (2010)
Working Paper: Businessman Candidates (2010)
Working Paper: Businessman Candidates (2010)
Working Paper: Businessman Candidates (2006)
Working Paper: Businessman Candidates (2006)
Working Paper: Businessman Candidates (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5985

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP5985

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().