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Polish Agriculture in Transition: Does it Hurt to be Slapped by an Invisible Hand?

Larry Karp and Spiro Stefanou

No 622, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Polish economic data are assembled in order to assess the impact on the agricultural sector of the recent reforms. Evidence of recovery in this sector is slight, but the decline seems to have halted. Policy issues for agricultural reform are discussed, emphasizing regulation of monopolistic input and processing sectors. The evidence for the existence and nature of these monopolies is reviewed and the goals of the chief regulatory body in Poland, the Antimonopoly Office, are summarized. A selection of recent models in industrial organization, dealing with entry, horizontal mergers and vertical control are used to provide a basis for assessing the direction of Polish regulatory policy.

Keywords: Government Regulation; Imperfect Competition; Polish Agriculture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L4 Q18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Polish Agriculture in Transition: Does it Hurt to be Slapped by an Invisible Hand? (1991) Downloads
Working Paper: Polish Agriculture in Transition: Does it Hurt to be Slapped by an Invisible Hand? (1991) Downloads
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