Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour

Giancarlo Spagnolo and Paolo Buccirossi

No 6349, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and competition, particularly with regard to cartel formation, and discusses how corporate governance and firm agency problems affect optimal law enforcement against cartels, both in terms of sanctions and leniency policies. Many of the conclusions appear applicable, with minor changes, to non-antitrust forms of collusion, such as collusion between auditors and management, and more generally to corporate and organized crime.

Keywords: Antitrust; Amnesty; Cartels; Ceo compensation; Collusion; Corruption; Corporate crime; Corporate fraud; Corporate governance; Corporate liability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 K00 L20 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-law and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP6349 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6349

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP6349

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().