International Labor Standards and the Political Economy of Child Labor Regulation

Fabrizio Zilibotti and Matthias Doepke

No 7196, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Child labor is a persistent phenomenon in many developing countries. In recent years, support has been growing among rich-country governments and consumer groups for the use of trade policies, such as product boycotts and the imposition of international labor standards, to reduce child labor in poor countries. In this paper, we discuss research on the long-run implications of such policies. In particular, we demonstrate that such measures may have the unintended side effect of lowering domestic support for banning child labor within developing countries, and thus may contribute to the persistence of the child-labor problem.

JEL-codes: J20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-lab, nep-pol and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Journal Article: International Labor Standards and the Political Economy of Child-Labor Regulation (2009)
Working Paper: International Labor Standards and the Political Economy of Child Labor Regulation (2008)
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