Economic and Monetary Union in Europe

Charles Bean

No 722, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper assesses the costs and benefits of monetary union in Europe. It is argued that neither the costs nor the benefits are in principle likely to be as great as critics and proponents respectively have suggested. Fiscal issues are, it is argued, likely to be far more significant. Fiscal federalism is by no means a necessary corollary of monetary union and the `Maastricht rules' on public debt and deficits will place harmful constraints on national fiscal policies. Finally the Community's Structural Funds are unlikely to be the most efficient way of redistributing resources between member states.

Keywords: European Monetary Union; Fiscal Federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 F33 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992-10
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