Delegation in International Monetary Policy Games

Juan Dolado, Mark Griffiths and Atilano Jorge Padilla

No 761, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In this paper we show that the delegation of monetary policy to an independent and more conservative central banker is an optimal policy in an international context with monetary spillovers between countries, even in the absence of time inconsistency (credibility) issues. We also study the welfare implications of delegating monetary policy and extend our analysis to incorporate the coordination of monetary policies.

Keywords: Delegation; International Economy; Monetary Policy; Spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Delegation in international monetary policy games (1994)
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