Does Regulation of Built-In Security Reduce Crime? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Jan C. van Ours and Ben Vollaard

No 7817, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: As of 1999, all new-built homes in the Netherlands have to have burglary-proof windows and doors. We provide evidence that this large-scale government intervention in the use of self-protective measures lowers crime and improves social welfare. We find the regulatory change to have reduced burglary in new-built homes from 1.1 to 0.8 percent annually, a reduction of 26 percent. The findings suggest that burglars avoid old, less-protected homes that are located in the direct vicinity of the new, better-protected homes. The presence of a negative externality on older homes is ambiguous. We find no evidence for displacement to other property crimes including theft from cars and bicycle theft. Even though the regulation of built-in security does not target preventative measures at homes that are most at risk, the social benefits of the regulation are likely to exceed the social costs.

Keywords: Crime; Government regulation; Victim precaution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H23 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does Regulation of Built‐in Security Reduce Crime? Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2011)
Working Paper: Does Regulation of Built-In Security Reduce Crime? Evidence From a Natural Experiment (2010)
Working Paper: Does Regulation of Built-In Security Reduce Crime? Evidence From a Natural Experiment (2010)
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