Social Insurance, Education, and Work Ethics

Mark Gradstein

No 7838, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This research shows that moral hazard associated with extant social insurance arrangements causes underinvestment in human capital, because of government?s inability to commit to welfare policies. It then argues that education policies, such as education subsidies or direct public investment in education, may achieve a second best and also help alleviating the deterioration of work norms.

Keywords: Education policies; Moral hazard; Social insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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