Employment protection versus flexicurity: on technology adoption in unionised firms

Kjell Lommerud ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Odd Rune Straume

No 7919, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We analyse how different labour market institutions--employment protection versus ?flexicurity?--affect technology adoption in unionised firms. We consider trade unions? incentives to oppose or endorse labour-saving technology and firms? incentives to invest in such technology. Increased flexicurity--interpreted as less employment protection and a higher reservation wage for workers--unambiguously increases firms? incentives for technology adoption. If unions have some direct influence on technology, a higher reservation wage also makes unions more willing to accept technological change. Less employment protection has the opposite effect, since this increases the downside (job losses) of labour-saving technology.

Keywords: Employment protection; Flexicurity; Technology adoption; Trade unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J38 J51 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Employment Protection Versus Flexicurity: On Technology Adoption in Unionised Firms (2012)
Working Paper: Employment Protection versus Flexicurity: On Technology Adoption in Unionised Firms (2008)
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