Oligopoly and Trade
J. Peter Neary and
Dermot Leahy
No 8172, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
In this chapter we present a selective analytic survey of some of the main results of trade under oligopoly. We concentrate on three topics: oligopoly as an independent determinant of trade, as illustrated by the reciprocal-markets model of Brander (1981); oligopoly as an independent rationale for government intervention, as illustrated by strategic trade and industrial policy in the third-market model of Spencer and Brander (1983); and the challenges and potential of embedding trade under oligopoly in general equilibrium as illustrated by the GOLE model of Neary (2002).
Keywords: Gole (general oligopolistic equilibrium); Reciprocal dumping; Strategic trade policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
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Chapter: Oligopoly and Trade (2013)
Working Paper: OLIGOPOLY AND TRADE (2010) 
Working Paper: Oligopoly and Trade (2010) 
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