Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent

Marco Pagano, Viral Acharya and Paolo Volpin

No 8905, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We present a model of labor market equilibrium in which managers are risk-averse, managerial talent (?alpha?) is scarce, and firms seek alpha, that is, compete for this talent. When managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient long-term compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent and insures low-quality managers. In contrast, when managers can move across firms, high-quality managers can fully extract the rents arising from their skill, which prevents firms from providing co-insurance among their employees. In anticipation, risk-averse managers may churn across firms before their performance is fully learnt and thereby prevent their efficient choice of projects. The result is excessive risk-taking with pay for short-term performance and build up of long-term risks. We conclude with analysis of policies to address the resulting inefficiency in firms' compensation.

Keywords: Short-termism; Executive compensation; Managerial talent; Managerial turnover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 G32 G38 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-hrm and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent (2016)
Working Paper: Seeking Alpha - Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent (2016)
Working Paper: Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent (2016)
Working Paper: Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent (2013)
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