Social Fragmentation, Public Goods and Elections: Evidence from China

Nancy Qian, Padró i Miquel, Gerard and Yang Yao

No 9278, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This study examines how the economic effects of elections in rural China depend on voter heterogeneity, for which we proxy with religious fractionalization. We first document religious composition and the introduction of village-level elections for a nearly nationally representative sample of over two hundred villages. Then, we examine the interaction effect of heterogeneity and the introduction of elections on village-government provision of public goods. The interaction effect is negative. We interpret this as evidence that voter heterogeneity constrains the potential benefits of elections for public goods provision.

Keywords: Democracy; Fractionalization; Pre-conditions; Religion; Voter heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O1 P1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Social Fragmentation, Public Goods and Elections: Evidence from China (2013)
Working Paper: Social Fragmentation, Public Goods and Elections: Evidence from China (2012)
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