Deception detection and the role of self-selection

Kai Konrad, Salmai Qari and Tim Lohse

No 9384, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We consider a lie-catching experiment with 9240 judgements. A set of videotapes shows subjects participating in a tax compliance experiment. The subjects chose whether or not to misreport. Subjects knew that underreporters were chosen for an audit with some probability. An audit led to detection and to a punishment fee. This compliance framework induced only persons with high deceptive abilities to underreport and, so, caused self-selection. Among the students who judged these videos, we find that the deception detection rate was significantly below 50 percent and even lower if the self-selection pressure in the tax compliance experiment was higher. This suggests that, when subjects can choose whether to state the truth or to lie, there is a self-selection effect by which individuals with higher deceptive ability are more likely to lie.

Keywords: Decision making; Interpersonal interaction; Judgment; Perception (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-iue
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP9384 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9384

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP9384

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().