Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price Commitment

Philipp Kircher and Kyungmin Kim

No 9785, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We consider a frictional two-sided matching market in which one side uses public cheap-talk announcements so as to attract the other side. We show that if the first-price auction is adopted as the trading protocol, then cheap talk can be perfectly informative, and the resulting market outcome is efficient, constrained only by search frictions. We also show that the performance of an alternative trading protocol in the cheap-talk environment depends on the level of price dispersion generated by the protocol: If a trading protocol compresses (spreads) the distribution of prices relative to the first-price auction, then an efficient fully revealing equilibrium always (never) exists. Our results identify the settings in which cheap talk can serve as an efficient competitive instrument, in the sense that the central insights from the literature on competing auctions and competitive search continue to hold unaltered even without ex ante price commitment.

Keywords: Directed search; Competitive search; Commitment; Cheap talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse, nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP9785 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price Commitment (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9785

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP9785

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().