Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies

Dominique Demougin () and Aloysius Siow ()

No 5, Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers from CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal

Abstract: The probability that an unskilled worker can be successfully trained and or screened to be a manager depends on the effort of the firm. With positive hiring costs, a firm prefers to train/screen its own managers. However the optimal size of the firm for productive efficiency may conflict with efficient managerial husbandry. How a firm copes with the above constraint generates stochastic layoffs, lateral mobility, promotions, diverse earnings profiles, fast track jobs and up or out rules.

Keywords: Hierarchies; on-the-job training; on-the-job screening; careers; up or out rules; fast track jobs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J M1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 1992-11
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Published, American Economic Review, 84(5), pages 1261-1277, December 1994

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