Nonexclusivity and adverse selection: An application to the annuity market

Agar Brugiavini and Gwenaël Piaser ()
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Gwenaël Piaser: Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg

LSF Research Working Paper Series from Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg

Abstract: Using a common agency framework, we characterize possible equilibria when annuities contracts are not exclusive. We discuss theoretical and empirical implications of these equilibria. First, we show that at equilibrium prices are not linear. Then we characterize an equilibrium. We provide conditions for existence and show that this equilibrium is efficient.

Keywords: Menus; Common Agency; Insurance; Annuity Markets; Adverse Selection; Efficiency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G1 H5 J2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Related works:
Working Paper: Non-exclusivity and adverse selection: An application to the annuity market (2006)
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