 Talent Management: the Role of BossesGuido Friebel and
Michael Raith
No 2531, RFBerlin Discussion Paper Series from Rockwool Foundation Berlin (RF Berlin) Abstract: Managers (“bosses†) are central to the development and allocation of human capital in firms because they train employees and learn about their abilities. While a multi-divisional firm wants to allocate workers to wherever they are most productive, bosses who are rewarded for their units’ performance prefer to hold on to good employees, and the prospect of losing good people weakens the incentives to train them. We derive the optimal incentive contract for bosses that enables a firm to change from “silos†with only upward mobility to a “lattice†with cross-divisional mobility. Compared to silos, a lattice achieves a more efficient allocation of people to positions, but also entails agency costs that may exceed the benefits. We suggest empirical predictions about when silos or a lattice are optimal, and relate our model and its results to examples and evidence. Keywords: middle managers; internal labor markets; human capital; training; talent hoarding; multi-divisional firm; intra-firm mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crm:wpaper:2531 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in RFBerlin Discussion Paper Series from Rockwool Foundation Berlin (RF Berlin) Contact information at EDIRC. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.